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Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, aims at distributive justice,which would be applied to the basic 
structure and institutions in a society. He argues, based on a thought experience called “The 
original position,” for his theory of justice as fairness. In what follows, first, I will elaborate on 
“the original position” as an argument for Rawls’ theory of justice. Secondly, I will talk about 
Rawls' ideal methodology. And finally, I shall explain three considerations about Rawls' argument 
of the original position, to see whether or not this methodologically ideal argument works for 
justice and fairness in our non-ideal situations? 
 
1- Rawls’ original position 
Rawls looks for some normative rules, which will entail to distributive justice. He wants to 
figure out fair social actions by referring to the thought experiment of the original position. That 
is, first, he imagines a well-ordered society, in which all individuals and things are brought up 
properly and justly, and then will refer to their social action and reactions in different situations. 
Then, he takes those results in that ideal situation as normative rules for the seemingly same 
problem in our non-ideal actual society.   
Following a Kantian metathetical framework, he believes in the right actions in social contract 
theory instead of a pretty utilitarian approach, which only cares about maximizing the expected 
utility for the whole society. Rawls, believe that justice is a more basic concept than “utility or 
interest,” and is not reduceable to them. He defined justice as fairness in terms of the original 
positions, which is an ideal situation, which all people intuitively could comprehend that.  
Rawls thought experience has at least four conditions: 
- Free will: which refers to the free status of the individuals, which are thought in the 
thought experience. That is, in the well-ordered society no one is compelled to do some 
action or make some decision. 
- Rationality: which refer to the mental statues, which will follow the means-end or 
instrumental rationality. That is, in the original position, each and all individuals know 
how to decide in different situations such that satisfy their goals very well.   
- Being interest-seeker: That is, each and all individuals and parties in the original 
position will seek the most interest for themselves. This condition looks very similar to 
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the utilitarianism approaches, however, the next condition will change the whole story and 
make Rawls’ theory as fairness pretty opposite to the utilitarian theory at work.  
- Vail of ignorance: Which is the most important feature of the original position. 
Rawls, on page section 24 (of A Theory of Justice) says: 
 
“The restrictions on particular information in the original position are, then, of 
fundamental importance. Without them, we would not be able to work out any definite 
theory of justice at all. We would have to be content with a vague formula stating that 
justice is what would be agreed to without being able to say much, if anything, about 
the substance of the agreement itself. The formal constraints of the concept of right, 
those applying to principles directly, are not sufficient for our purpose. The veil of 
ignorance makes possible a unanimous choice of a particular conception of justice. 
Without these limitations on knowledge the bargaining problem of the original 
position would be hopelessly complicated. Even if theoretically a solution were to 
exist, we would not, at present anyway, be able to determine it.” 
 
       Accordingly, the veil of ignorance is basically a ground for every conception of justice due to 
the simplicity which is required for such a conception or theory. Rawls says that the only thing 
which all parties, in the original position, know for certain is that their society is subject to justice 
and so they have to organize their society such that would guarantee justice and fairness for all 
individuals of the society. For him knowing the particular facts about every individual make such 
a general agreement on the fair and just organizations pretty impassible. That is, if the individuals 
know all the information about their situations in the original positions, then they high probably 
would treat unfairly and partially about the rules which will affect their situation. So, simplicity is 
necessary and important for any conception of justice in the original position.  Put it in other words, 
a theory of justice would be possible only if a kind of ambiguity and ignorance is involved. That 
is, 
“Parties do not know: 
- The race, ethnicity, gender, age, income, wealth, natural endowments, 
comprehensive doctrine, etc. of any of the citizens in society, or to which generation in 
the history of the society these citizens belong. 
- The political system of the society its class structure, economic system, or level of 
economic development. 
Parties do know: 
o That citizens in a society have different comprehensive doctrines and plans 
of life; that all citizens have interests in more primary goods. 
 3 
o That the society is under conditions of moderate scarcity: there is enough to 
go around, but not enough for everyone to get what they want; 
o General facts and common sense about human social life; general 
conclusions of science (including economics and psychology) that are 
uncontroversial.” (Wenar, 2017) 
 
According to Rawls, in such situation, all individuals and parties tried to think of the worst 
situations in the actual word, and then decide about the political and social institutions and 
structures that will satisfy the requirements of the low-class people, due to the fact that they don't 
know whether or not they will be in that low class. They try to maximize the minimum level of 
interest and primary goods of all and low-level people - maximin reasoning. This maximization 
might be relevant to context. (Afroogh 2021) 
Actually, applying veil of ignorance, Rawls, wants to keep the social rules and agreements 
pure and not contaminated by personal interests,  inclinations, and desires. He wants to make a fair 
well order situations, in which all individuals think about the situations of all people fairly and 
freely. This hypothetical situation will result in a kind of unconditional goodness, which proposed 
by Kant, because nobody is bound by their subjective desires. All individuals only think of the 
whole goodness for all individuals and parties in society. Then, this thought experience, Rawls 
claims that would lead us to these two principles of justice: 
 
First Principle: Each person has the same right to the system of equal basic liberties, which is 
compatible with the same system for all. 
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to arranged so that to satisfy two 
conditions: 
a. They are attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair 
equality of opportunity; 
b. They are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged people of society -





2- Ideal non vs. non-Ideal theory 
For Rawls,  
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“ideal theory contrasts with non-ideal theory and identifies a limitation in the scope of his 
theory of justice. Both kinds of theories attempt to identify principles that should regulate 
basic social institutions for the sake of justice. How do they differ? The first and fundamental 
difference is that ideal theory assumes "strict compliance", that is, that "(nearly) everyone 
strictly complies with...the principles of justice" (2001: 13). Non-ideal theory, by contrast, 
tells us how to deal with non-compliance. It thus "comprises such topics as the theory of 
punishment, the doctrine of just war, and the justification of the various ways of opposing 
unjust regimes, ranging from civil disobedience and conscientious objection to militant 




“However, ideal theory has a second feature: it “...assumes strict compliance and works 
out the principles that characterize a well-ordered society under favorable circumstances" 
(1999a: 216). The second difference between ideal and non-ideal theory, then, is that the 
former assumes favorable circumstances.” (Estlund, 2012, p 375) 
 
Rawls proposes his theory of justice in terms of the ideal theory, and his core methodological 
idea seemingly is that we can use the conclusions and ideas in the abstract or "ideal situations” as 
a guideline for “non-ideal” or concrete ones. In the ideal situation, all the individuals and parties 
want to follow the principle of justice, while in the actual world, it is not so; however, we can think 
of ideal situations just to make sure how is the correct and just dealing in fact, and then we can use 
those correct ideas in act. 
 
3- Three Considerations 
 
As it is clear, Rawls would figure out the fairness in a well-ordered society in the original 
position, and then will refer to their social reactions and decision in that ideal situation to prescribe 
some justice-oriented normative rules for the actual and non-ideal social institution and structures. 
In what follows, I shall explain three considerations about Rawls’ argument of the original position 




3.1- Consideration on Rawls’ subjective intuition 
Rawl’s subjective intuition in the original position is not necessarily inclusive. Rawls argues 
that we need to consider the action and decisions of different individuals and parties in the original 
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position. However, to figure out what those decisions are, he didn't use an empirical method to see 
what such people in a well-ordered society will do. He just discusses transcendentally that and 
argues that such a people definitely will follow the maximin reasoning, which says I (as an agent 
in the original position) have to maximize the minimum level of goods. He holds that this principle 
will support his justice theory as fairness.  
My consideration is that how Rawls can legitimately ascribe “following the maximin 
reasoning" to all the individuals in the original position? Yes, Rawls “think” that it would be 
rational for those agents in the original position to follow it, however, his thinking doesn’t 
necessarily guarantee those individuals' actions and decisions in the original position. Every person 
might think differently about the individual's action and decision in the thought experiment of the 
original position. How can Rawls legitimately generalize his idea and intuition about the 
individual's decision in the original position to all other people who are supposed to think about 
this thought experiment?  
For example, one person might think that maximin reasoning doesn’t work in the ideal 
position. One might think that it is not rational to be that cautions, and it might be rational to take 
some risk. I mean, the veil of ignorance doesn't necessarily lead the agents to follow maximin 
reasoning, because it might be non-effective enough. Look at the following situations: 
 
 Circumstance   
Decision C1 C2 C3 
D1 -1 8000 12000 
D2 -1 7 14 
D3 0 6 8 
 
 
In this situation, the maximum principle says that a rational agent in the original position will 
do D3, however, it seems that many of the rational agents will take D1. If so, the original position 
argument will not support Rawl's theory of justice as fairness due to the fact that the agents will 
follow different decisions and policies. 
My main consideration here addresses Rawl’s subjective, intuitive method in the original 
position. He just refers to his own transcendental idea and intuition and then will generalize it to 
all the possible agents in the original position, irrespective of the experimental data, or some other 
alternatives at works. 
 
3.2- Two considerations on “Legitimacy” 
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Rawls, in section 53 (A Theory of Justice), talks about    “the duty to comply with an unjust 
law." He states:  
“the principles of justice (in lexical order) belong to ideal theory (§39). The persons in 
the original position assume that the principles they acknowledge, what-ever they are, will be 
strictly complied with and followed by everyone. …. When we ask whether and under what 
circumstances unjust arrangements are to be tolerated, we are faced with a different sort of 
question. We must ascertain how the ideal conception of justice applies, if indeed it applies at 
all, to cases where rather than having to make adjustments to natural limitations, we are 
confronted with injustice. The discussion of these problems belongs to the partial compliance 
part of non-ideal theory.” 
 
Accordingly, he holds that the situations and circumstances are different in ideal and non-
ideal context, and so we need to make flexible rules such that they fit with the non-ideal context. 
So, Rawls states that we have to allow some limited unjust law in the non-ideal context. He says:  
“We must consider the question why, in a situation of near justice anyway, we normally 
have a duty to comply with unjust, and not simply with just, laws.” 
 
Rawls’ argument is based on the majority principle. He states (in section 53 of A Theory of 
Justice) that  
“The constitution is regarded as a just but imperfect procedure framed as far as the 
circumstances permit to insure a just outcome. It is imperfect because there is no feasible 
political process which guarantees that the laws enacted in accordance with it will be just. In 
political affairs perfect procedura justice cannot be achieved. Moreover, the constitutional 
process must rely, to a large degree, on some form of voting. …. Nevertheless, our natural 
duty to uphold just institutions binds us to comply with unjust laws and policies, or at least 
not to oppose them by illegal means as long as they do not exceed certain limits of injustice. 
Being required to support a just constitution, we must go along with one of its essential 
principles, that of majority rule. In a state of near justice, then, we normally have a duty to 
comply with unjust laws in virtue of our duty to support a just constitution. Given men as they 
are, there are many occasions when this duty will come into play.” 
 
That is, the most important thing here is to support the authority of the whole just 
constitutional structure, and to do that, we need to support all rules so far it will be changed through 
a new procedural decision. We can not help undermind or violate the rules,  only because we think 
there are some unjust rules in it. He proposes the concept of “civil disobedience” to deal with such 
unjust laws; however, he emphasized that it doenst equal to undermining the whole system. Put it 
in other words, as Rawls himself do in the “political liberalism,” his solution is based on the 
concept of legitimacy. That is,  
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“Thus, legitimacy is a weaker idea than justice and imposes weaker constraints on what 
can be done. It is also institutional, though there is, of course, an essential connection with 




“it may not be very just, or hardly so, and similarly for its laws and policies. Laws passed 
by solid majorities are counted legitimate, even though many protests and correctly judge 
them unjust or otherwise wrong.” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IX, #5) 
 
Accordingly, for Rawls, legitimacy is more effective than justice, and so we can apply the 
legitimate yet unjust laws on our non-ideal societies. He also adds 
“A legitimate procedure gives rise to legitimate laws and policies made in accordance 
with it, and legitimate procedures may be customary, long-established, and accepted as such. 
Neither the procedures nor the laws need be just by a strict standard of justice, even if, what 
is also true, they cannot be too gravely unjust. … Legitimacy allows an undetermined range 
of injustice that justice might not permit.” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IX, #5) 
 
And he states: 
“While the idea of legitimacy is clearly related to justice, it is noteworthy that its special 
role in democratic institutions (noted briefly in §2) is to authorize an appropriate procedure 
for making decisions when the conflicts and disagreements in political life make unanimity 
impossible or rarely to be expected.” (Rawls, Political Liberalism, lecture IX, #5) 
 
So, as it is clear from these passages, Rawls allows having some unjust laws to some extent 
because it is the only way that we can protect the authority of our legal institution and the whole 
structure, which is the main supporter of justice in a society.  
By proposing the concept of "legitimacy," Rawls wants to fill out the gap between ideal and 
non-ideal situations. He will provide a solution to keep the authority of the justice institution in 
our actual non-ideal societies. However, I believe that the gap between ideal and non-ideal context 
can not be filled out only by invoking the concept of legitimacy. (Afroogh 2019,2020) I mean, 
there are some other problems with Rawls' method of taking the ideal theories as some criteria or 






3.2.1 The consideration of Excusable hard cases 
I believe that knowing about “ideal” situations and principles helps us in having a better 
understanding of justice in non-ideal situations; however, I am not sure it helps us in having a 
better understanding of unjustice in non-ideal situations. That is, a common ideal opinion may 
help us in recognizing justice and just people even in non-ideal and actual situations in our 
everyday life; However, recognizing unjust people, or ascribing “being unjust” to ordinary people 
in non-ideal situations, based on the opinions in ideal situations doesn’t look fair or rational.  
In the ideal situation, one of the parties and individuals violate the other ones' rights. They are 
treated with each other respectfully and equally. However, in the non-ideal situations, where some 
people violate your rights, is it rational to expect you to don’t do the same and still keep their rights 
preserved? Imagine a case (in a close possible world) that your neighbor will violate your rules as 
long as you don’t violate his right. That is, he stops violating your right only if you violate his right 
at least one time per month. If so, it seems that you have no choice to protect your right exempt 
violating his rights one time per month just to preserve your personal rights.  Or, in other cases, 
imagine a poor girl, Sara, who steal just to provide the medicine for her sick mother. I am not sure 
that it is legitimate to say that Sara, who steals in the actual non-ideal situation, is a necessarily 
unjust person. She might do that because she was in a very bad financial situation, and so she is 
considered excusable. I mean, there are hard cases in the actual word, in which we can not relay 
to justice vs. injustice dichotomy. There are some situations, in the non-ideal world, which are 
neither just nor unjust. They are excusable hard cases. 
I use “excusable” to refer to the cases, which are not included in Ralw’s legitimate rules. 
Because, according to Rawls, legitimate rules include unjust rules, which we have to follow only 
to keep the authorities of the whole system. However, the excusable cases, which I am talking 
about, are not “unjust” cases. They are neither just nor unjust. They are some hard cases, which 
belong to the non-ideal world. It is not surprising that Rawls methodology doesn't lead us to the 
concept of “excusable,” case, because it is primarily dependent on the ideal situations, and comes 
out of it, which lacks these hard and complicated cases. 
 
3.2.2 The problem of the veil of ignorance   
For Rawls, the veil of ignorance doesn't remove our judgmental faculty and doesn't 
negatively affect our evaluation ability. It only: 
“prevents us from shaping our moral view to accord with our own particular attachments 
and interests. We do not look at the social order from our situation but take up a point of 
view that everyone can adopt on an equal footing.” (Section 78, A Theory of Justice) 
 
It is pretty understandable that wail of ignorance helps the agents in the non-ideal situation 
to thing fairly and justly. That is, if the individuals know all the information about their 
situations in the original positions, then they high probably would treat unfairly and partially 
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about the rules which will affect their situation. So, simplicity is necessary and important for 
any conception of justice in the original position.   
Put it in other words, a theory of justice would be possible only if a kind of ambiguity and 
ignorance is involved. It is the advantage of the veil of ignorance for justice.  However, I am 
not sure that wail of ignorance doesn’t undermine our judgment faculty, as Rawls claims. The 
veil of ignorance seemingly has a negative effect on our information about non-ideal and actual 
worlds, and it simply undermines our realistic judgments. It seems to me that it is clear that 
when you consider all the individuals at the same status in ideal world, then you even can not 
imagine some complicated situations and hard cases, in the non-ideal world, in which we face 
many controversial justice/unjustice problems. Foexmple, as Rawls indicates, empathy plays 
an important role in justice, and we now that a major kind of empathy is cognitive empathy, 
which refers to our ability to understand other people's minds, and feelings in different hard 
and complicated situations (Stueber, 2019.) It is pretty plausible to think that wail of ignorance, 
by ignoring many of the subjective information about certain individuals and parties, would 
negatively affect our epistemic empathy factually. So, I believe that wail of ignorance had 
some disadvantages for any theory of justice as well. 
 
4. Conclusion 
To sum it up, I believe that Rawls methodology to apply some ideal theories on our non-
ideal actual society, gives us definitely a better understanding of justice in the wolds; however, 
I am not sure that his arguments of the original position, which use such idealist method, can 
give us a plausible result for all hard and complicated cases. I have observed three major 
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